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This paper explores similarities and differences between the run-up of oil prices in 2007-08 and earlier
oil price shocks, looking at what caused the price increase and what effects it had on the economy.
Whereas historical oil price shocks were primarily caused by physical disruptions of supply, the price
run-up of 2007-08 was caused by strong demand confronting stagnating world production.  Although
the causes were different, the consequences for the economy appear to have been very similar to those
observed in earlier episodes, with significant effects on overall consumption spending and purchases
of domestic automobiles in particular.  In the absence of those declines, it is unlikely that we would
have characterized the period 2007:Q4 to 2008:Q3 as one of economic recession for the U.S.  The
experience of 2007-08 should thus be added to the list of recessions to which oil prices appear to have
made a material contribution.
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Figure 1 plots the real price of oil over the last half century. A series of dramatic events
in the 1970s sent the price of oil over $40/barrel by the end of the decade, which would be
over $100/barrel in current prices. The price remained very volatile after the collapse in the
1980s, but was still as low as $20/barrel in 2001. The next 6 years saw a steady increase
that tripled the real price by the middle of 2007. Later that year, the path of oil prices
steepened sharply, sending the price to a high of $145/barrel on July 3, 2008, only to be
followed by an even more spectacular price collapse. What caused this remarkable behavior
of oil prices, and what were the eﬀects on the economy?
To answer these questions, I begin in Section 2 by exploring the causes of several of
the big oil shocks of the late 20th century, and then turn in Section 3 to an analysis of
what happened to produce the dramatic price moves in 2007 and 2008. Section 4 reviews
some of the evidence of how the economy seemed to respond to earlier oil price shocks, with
Section 5 investigating the eﬀects on the U.S. economy of the oil shock of 2007-2008. Some
implications for policy are brieﬂy noted in Section 6.
2 Causes of historical oil shocks.
2.1 Some observations on petroleum demand.
The most important principle for understanding short-run changes in the price of oil is the
fact that income rather than price is the key determinant of the quantity demanded. One
1quick way to become convinced of this fact is to examine Figure 2, which plots petroleum
consumption against GDP for the U.S. over the last 60 years.1 Despite the huge ﬂuctuations
in the relative price of oil over this period, petroleum consumption followed income growth
remarkably steadily. There was some downward adjustment in oil use at the end of the
1970s, though achieving that 20% drop in petroleum consumption required an 80% increase
in the relative price and two recessions in a 3-year period over 1980-82.
There is a ﬂattening in the slope of this path over time, which some might attribute
to delayed conservation consequences of the 1970s oil shocks. However, this ﬂatter slope
persists long after the price had fallen quite dramatically, and seems more likely to be due
to the fact that income elasticity declines as a country becomes more developed. One sees
a similar pattern of slowing growth of petroleum use as other developed countries became
richer, while post-1990 data for the newly industrialized countries is still quite supportive of
an income elasticity near unity (Hamilton, 2009; Gately and Huntington, 2002).
Table 1 summarizes the estimated price elasticities for gasoline and crude oil demand
from a half-dozen meta-analyses or literature reviews. Since crude oil represents about half
the retail cost of gasoline, one would expect that a 10% increase in the price of crude would
be associated with a 5% increase in the price of gasoline,2 in which case the price elasticity
of the demand for crude oil should be about half as big as that for retail gasoline. Most of
1 This is essentially a scatterplot with adjacent years connected by a smoothed curve. Tracing this curve
from the lower left to the upper right identiﬁes the combinations of real GDP and petroleum consumption
that were observed at increasingly later dates as one moves along the curve.
2 The regression coeﬃcient relating the log of the nominal U.S. gasoline retail price to the log
of the nominal WTI in a monthly cointegrating regression estimated over 1993:M4-2008:M8 is 0.62.
Data from EIA, “Spot Prices for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,” http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/
pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_m.htm.
2the studies behind these summaries reported low estimates of the price-elasticity of gasoline
demand and signiﬁcantly smaller elasticities for crude.
The price elasticity of petroleum demand has always been small, and it is hard to avoid
a n yc o n c l u s i o no t h e rt h a nt h a ti th a db e c o m ea ne v e ns m a l l e rn u m b e rf o rt h eU . S .i nt h e
2000s. One can barely detect any downward deviation from the trend in petroleum con-
sumption in Figure 2 despite the enormous price increase through 2007. Hughes, Knittel,
and Sperling (2008) estimated that short-run gasoline demand elasticity was in the range of
0.21 to 0.34 over 1975-1980 but between only 0.034 and 0.077 for the 2001-06 period.
Another key parameter for determining the consequences of an energy price increase for
the economy is the value share of energy purchases relative to total expenditures. The
fact that the U.S. income elasticity of demand has been substantially below unity over the
last quarter century induces a downward trend in that share— for a given relative price, if
the percentage growth in energy use is less than the percentage growth in income, total
dollar expenditures on energy would decline as a percentage of income. On the other hand,
the very low short-run price elasticity of demand causes the value share to move in the
same direction as the relative price— if the percentage increase in price is greater than the
percentage decrease in quantity demanded, dollar spending as a share of income will rise
when the price of energy goes up.
Figure 3 displays the net eﬀect of these two factors on spending by consumers on energy
goods and purchases as a percentage of total consumption spending. The income-elasticity
eﬀect imparts a chronic downward trend, and by 2002 this share had fallen to a little over 4%
3of a typical consumer’s total budget. However, subsequent energy price increases produced
a dramatic reversal of this trend, with the share in 2008 almost twice the 2002 value.
Figure 3 also serves to remind us that a price elasticity cannot be globally below unity.
If you don’t reduce the quantity purchased by as much in percentage terms as the price
goes up, the item comes to consume a larger fraction of your budget. If the price elasticity
were globally less than unity, an arbitrarily large price increase would ultimately bring the
consumer to a point where 100% of the budget was going to energy, in which case ignoring
the price would no longer be physically possible. The low expenditure share in the early
part of this decade may be part of the explanation for why Americans were largely ignoring
the early price increases— we didn’t change our behavior much because most of us could
aﬀord not to. By 2007-08, however, the situation had changed, as energy had once again
returned to an importance for a typical budget that we had not seen since the 1970s.
2.2 Historical supply disruptions.
Figure 4 plots monthly oil production levels for three Middle East countries that have re-
currently appeared in the news over the last 35 years. Three events over this period— the
I r a n i a nr e v o l u t i o ni nt h ef a l lo f1978, Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 1980, and Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990— resulted in dramatic and immediate disruption of the
ﬂow of oil from key global producers. Another episode, not evident in Figure 4 but that
I will nevertheless include in the set of historical oil shocks discussed, is the cut in oil pro-
duction that followed the Yom Kippur War that began October 6, 1973. Although the
military conﬂict did not directly prevent any signiﬁcant shipments of oil, the Organization
4of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced3 on October 16t h a ti tw o u l d
cut production by 5%
until the Israeli forces are completely evacuated from all the Arab territories
occupied in the June 1967 war and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people
are restored.
Hamilton (2003) included the Suez Crisis of 1956 as a ﬁfth signiﬁcant oil shock, though
the price increase from that episode was much more modest, and data for the kinds of
comparisons performed below are not readily available for that period, so this paper will use
just these four episodes.
T h eb o l dl i n ei nt h eﬁrst column of Figure 5 records the drop in oil production from the
aﬀected countries in the months following the events just mentioned. The ﬁrst panel in
that column uses the combined output of the members of OAPEC. The panel in the second
row, ﬁrst column shows the production from Iran. The third row of column 1 gives the
combined production of Iran and Iraq, and the fourth row the combined production of Iraq
and Kuwait. In each case, the production shortfall is expressed as a percentage of total
global production prior to the shock.4 Each of these events knocked out between 7 and 9
percent of world supply.
3 Quotation is taken from an OAPEC ministers’ press release reported by Al-Sowayegh (1984, p. 129).
4 These numbers diﬀer slightly from the values reported in Table 4 of Hamilton (2003) due to small
diﬀerences in the estimates of total global oil production used, and the fact that here the Iranian shortfall
is dated as beginning in October rather than September of 1978.
5In each episode, there was some increase in production coming from other countries that
partially mitigated the consequences. The net consequences of the disruptions are captured
by the dashed lines in the ﬁrst column of Figure 5, which portray the percentage decline in
actual total world production following each of the events. Production increases from other
countries were rather minor in 1973-74, but quite substantial in 1990-91.
The subsequent path of oil prices is indicated in the second column of Figure 5. Each
of these episodes was associated with signiﬁcant increases in the price of oil, with the price
jumping 25% in 1980 and 70% in 1990. Note that there were some price controls in eﬀect
for the ﬁrst three episodes, which spread the consequences over time.
Kilian (forthcoming) downplays the contribution of these supply disruptions to the price
movements portrayed in Figure 5, instead attributing much of the historical ﬂuctuations in
the price of oil to what he describes as “precautionary demand associated with market con-
cerns about the availability of future oil supplies.” He identiﬁes the latter as any movements
in the real price of oil that cannot be explained statistically by his measures of shocks to
supply and aggregate demand. Another way one might try to measure the contribution of
precautionary demand is by looking at changes in inventories. The third column of Figure
5 records the monthly change in U.S. inventories of crude oil and petroleum products be-
ginning with the ﬁrst month of each of the four episodes, again measured as a percentage of
total global production. In each of these episodes, inventories were going down, not up, at
the time of the sharpest price movements, suggesting that inventory changes were serving
to mitigate rather than aggravate the magnitude of the price shocks. Positive inventory
6investment typically came much later, as ﬁrms sought to restock the storage that had been
earlier drawn down.
One can also explore whether the supply disruptions alone oﬀer a suﬃcient explanation
for the observed price movements on the basis of plausible elasticities. Table 2 compares the
average decline in global oil production during these four episodes with the observed price
change to calculate implied price-elasticities of demand under the assumption that there was
zero shift in demand from growing income over these episodes and that the supply shift was
the sole explanation for the price increase. These elasticities are a bit smaller than might
have been expected from the consensus estimates in Table 1, but in no case does it seem
implausible on the basis of the implied elasticity to attribute most of the price change to the
supply shortfall itself.
Kilian (2008) also argues that the bold lines in the ﬁrst column of Figure 5 overstate the
magnitude of the supply disruptions caused by these 4 episodes. He observes, for example,
that Iraq increased production signiﬁcantly in anticipation of both the 1980 and 1990 wars,
so that using the Iraqi production levels just prior to the conﬂict overstates the size of the
shock (see the middle panel of Figure 4). Note, however, that this is not a factor in the
dashed lines of Figure 5 or the calculations in Table 2, which are based on the observed global
decline subsequent to the indicated date. Moreover, despite the high levels of pre-war Iraqi
production, global production in September 1980 was 2.9% below its level 3 months earlier
and 5.4% below its level of 6 month earlier. Likewise, global production in July 1990 was
down 2.1% or 0.7% from its values 3 months or 6 months earlier. Hence, if we’d compared
7global production in these episodes with a value earlier than the September 1980 or July
1990 reference dates used, the imputed quantity reductions in Table 2 would have been even
more signiﬁcant.
Kilian (forthcoming) and Barsky and Kilian (2002) argue, quite correctly in my view,
that demand pressures also made a contribution to the magnitudes of the oil price increase
observed in several of these episodes. In particular, it would be irresponsible to claim that
the nominal oil price increase in 1973-74 had nothing to do with the general inﬂation and
boom in the prices of other commodities also observed at that time. Nevertheless, I share
Blinder and Rudd’s (2008) doubts about whether inﬂationary pressures can be construed as
the primary explanation for why OAPEC chose to reduce the quantity of oil they produced
by 5% within weeks of the onset of the Yom Kippur War.
My overall conclusion thus supports the conventional interpretation: historical oil price
shocks were primarily caused by signiﬁcant disruptions in crude oil production that were
brought about by largely exogenous geopolitical events.
3 Causes of the oil shock of 2007-08.
Figure 6 plots ﬁve diﬀerent measures of energy prices during the last quarter of 2007 and
ﬁrst half of 2008. By any measure, this episode qualiﬁes as one of biggest shocks to oil
prices on record. However, the causes were quite diﬀerent from events associated with the
4 episodes examined above.
83.1 Supply.
Despite occasional dramatic news such as hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in September
2005, turmoil in Nigeria in 2006-2008, and ongoing strife in Iraq, global production has been
remarkably stable; (see Figure 7). The big story has been not a dramatic reduction in
supply of the kinds summarized in Figure 5, but a failure of production to increase between
2005 and 2007.
Why did global production stagnate? In any given producing ﬁeld, eventually pressure
falls and daily production levels begin to decline. Increasing global production requires
moving on to new producing areas. The U.S. has been extensively explored and developed,
and total U.S. production is now about half the level we achieved in 1971;( s e et h et o p
panel of Figure 8) World production nevertheless has increased substantially since then
as new ﬁelds became developed, though Figure 8 shows that several of these are now in
signiﬁcant decline, including the North Sea (which had accounted for 8% of world production
in 2001) and Mexico’s Cantarell Field (formerly the world’s second largest producing ﬁeld).
Production declines caused former OPEC member Indonesia to become an oil importer, and
the nation dropped out of OPEC in 2008.
The most important world oil exporter has for many years been Saudi Arabia, whose
monthly production levels are plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 8. These have his-
torically been quite volatile and exhibited substantial swings up and down not because of
depletion but because the Saudis followed a deliberate strategy of adjusting production in
an eﬀort to stabilize prices. For example, the kingdom’s decision to substantially increase
9production in late 1990 was a reason why the oil price shock of 1990 was so short-lived (see
the bottom row of Figure 5).
Because the Saudis had historically used their excess capacity to mitigate the eﬀects
of short-run supply shortfalls, many analysts had assumed that they would continue to
do the same in response to the longer run pressure of growing world demand, and most
forecasts called for continuing increases in Saudi production levels over time. For example,
even as recently as in their 2007 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency
was projecting that the Saudis would be pumping 12 million barrels per day by 2010. In
the event, however, Saudi production went down rather than up in 2007. It is a matter of
conjecture whether the decline in Saudi production in 2007 should be attributed to depletion
of its Ghawar oil ﬁeld, to a deliberate policy decision in response to a perceived decline in
the price-elasticity of demand, or to long-run considerations discussed below. Whatever its
cause, the decline in Saudi production was certainly one important factor contributing to
the stagnation in world oil production over 2005-2007. It also unambiguously denotes the
latter episode as a new era as far as oil pricing dynamics are concerned— without the Saudis’
willingness or ability to adjust production to smooth out price changes, any disturbance to
supply or demand would have a signiﬁcantly bigger eﬀect on price after 2005 compared with
earlier periods.
3.2 Demand.
Although supply stagnated, demand was growing strongly. Particularly noteworthy is oil
consumption in China, which has been growing at a 7% compound annual rate over the
10last two decades; (see Figure 9). Chinese consumption in 2007 was 870,000 barrels per day
higher in 2007 than it had been in 2005.
How can it be that China was consuming more oil, yet no more oil was being produced?
Mathematically, consumption in other regions had to decline, and indeed it did. Consump-
tion in the U.S. in 2007 was 122,000 b/d below its level in 2005; Europe dropped 346,000 and
Japan 318,000. And what persuaded residents of these countries to reduce oil consumption
in the face of rising incomes? The answer is, the price had to increase suﬃciently to reduce
consumption in the OECD countries commensurate with the increase from China, given the
stagnation in total global production.
Let us consider some quick ballpark estimates of how big a price increase that should have
required. According to IMF estimates,5 World real GDP experienced 2-year total growth
of 9.4% in 2004 and 2005. As noted above, the income elasticity of petroleum demand in
countries like the U.S. is currently about 0.5, whereas in the newly industrialized countries
it may be above unity (Hamilton, 2009; Gately and Huntington, 2002). World petroleum
production was 5 million barrels per day higher in 2005 than in 2003, a 6% increase. Thus it
is entirely plausible to attribute the 6% increase in oil consumption between 2003 and 2005
to a shift in the demand curve caused by the increase in world GDP.
World real GDP grew an additional 10.1% in 2006 and 2007. Hence it seems reasonable
to suppose that, if oil had remained at the 2005 price of $55/barrel, quantity demanded
would have increased by at least another 5 million barrels per day by the end of 2007. Eco-
5 IMF, World Economic Outook: October 2008, Table A.1.
11nomic growth slowed signiﬁcantly in 2008:H1, but remained positive, and I’ve conservatively
assumed that economic growth would have added at least another half million barrels per
day to the quantity demanded in the ﬁrst half of 2008, more than enough to absorb the
slight increase in global production that ﬁnally appeared in the ﬁrst half of 2008. Under
these assumptions, the price had to rise between 2005 and 2008:H1 by an amount suﬃcient
to reduce the quantity demanded by 5 mb/d; (see the top panel of Figure 10).
It’s worth commenting on what was new about the contribution of Chinese and world
economic growth over this period. While China had been growing at the remarkable rate
noted for a quarter century, it has only recently become big enough relative to the global
economy to make a material diﬀerence. For example, the 4.9% world GDP average annual
growth rate over 2003-2007 compares with a 2.9% average over the robust 1990s. And
judging from the gap between EIA ﬁgures for China’s total petroleum production and con-
sumption,6 China was a net exporter of petroleum up until 1992, and its imports were only
up to 800,000 barrels/day in 1998. But by 2007, China’s net imports were estimated to
be 3.6 million barrels per day, making it the world’s third biggest importer and a dominant
factor in current world markets. The magnitude of the global growth in petroleum demand
in recent years is thus quite remarkable, and although there have been other episodes when
global production stagnated over a two-year period, these were inevitably either responses
to falling demand during recessions or physical supply disruptions detailed above.
6 Data from EIA, “World Petroleum Consumption, Most Recent Annual Estimates,1980-2007,”
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/RecentPetroleumConsumptionBarrelsperDay.xls) and “World
Production of Crude Oil, NGPL, and Other Liquids, and Reﬁnery Processing Gain, Most Recent Annual Esti-
mates, 1980-2007,„ (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/RecentTotalOilSupplyBarrelsperDay.xls).
12Although Figure 10 is drawn with vertical short-run supply curves, the analysis here does
not require any particular assumptions about the short-run supply elasticity. I simply take
it as an observed fact that, as a result of whatever combination of shifts of or movements
along the short-run supply curve, the quantity supplied in 2008:H1 was essentially the same
as that supplied in 2005 and that the price and output pairs for the two dates both represent
an intersection of supply and demand. The exercise explores the necessary adjustments if
the strong growth of world GDP between the two periods is presumed to have shifted the
demand curve to the right by 5.5 mb/d. The question is then, what price increase would have
been necessary to have moved along that second demand curve to a point where quantity
demanded would have been as low as 85.5 mb/d?
The answer to that question depends of course on the slope of the 2008:H1 demand curve.
If, for illustration, the price-elasticity of demand were ε =0 .06, then the price would have








On the other hand, such numerical calculations are extremely sensitive to the assumptions
about the short-run price elasticity of demand. If instead the elasticity were ε =0 .10, the
price would only need to rise to $97 to prevent global quantity demanded from increasing.
Which is the correct short-run elasticity, 0.06 or 0.10? Recalling Tables 1 and 2, one
could easily defend either value or numbers signiﬁcantly smaller or bigger. Moreover, as
noted by Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008), the elasticity relevant for 2007-08 could have
been much smaller than those that governed other episodes. One key variable to look at
13for this question is the value of inventories. If the price increase between 2005 and 2008:H1
was bigger than needed to equate supply with demand, inventories should have been piling
up, whereas if the price increase was too small, inventories would be drawn down.
We don’t have reliable data on all stored oil, but have pretty good measures on the
inventories of crude oil held by U.S. reﬁners. Figure 11 plots the average seasonal pattern
of these inventories, along with the actual values in 2007 and 2008. In the ﬁrst half of 2007,
inventories were a bit above trend. But in late 2007 and the ﬁrst half of 2008, when the
price increases were most dramatic, inventories were signiﬁcantly below normal, suggesting
that indeed an assumed elasticity of 0.10 was too big, and that price increases through the
end of 2007 were not suﬃcient to bring quantity demanded down to equal quantity supplied.
Just as academics may debate what is the correct value for the price elasticity of crude oil
demand, market participants can’t be certain, either. Many observers have wondered what
could have been the nature of the news that sent the price of oil from $92/barrel in December
2007 to its all-time high of $145 in July 2008. Clearly it’s impossible to attribute much of
this move to a major surprise that economic growth in 2008:H1 was faster than expected or
that the oil production gains were more modest than anticipated. The big uncertainty, I
would argue, was the value of ε. The big news of 2008:H1 was the surprising observation
that even $100 oil was not going to be suﬃcient to prevent global quantity demanded from
increasing above 85.5 mb/d and that no more than 85.5 mb/d was going to be available.
This explanation of the price shock also requires that market participants could have had
little inkling in 2008:H1 of the massive economic deterioration that was just ahead. In this,
14they certainly would have had some good company. Here was the analysis oﬀered publicly
by European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet on July 3, 2008:7
On the basis of our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided at to-
day’s meeting to increase the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points....[Inﬂation
is] expected to remain well above the level consistent with price stability for a
more protracted period than previously thought.... [W]hile the latest data con-
ﬁrm the expected weakening of real GDP growth in mid-2008 after exceptionally
strong growth in the ﬁrst quarter, the economic fundamentals of the euro area
are sound.
And although a growth slowdown in the United States was certainly acknowledged at
that point, many were unpersuaded that it would become serious enough to qualify as a true
recession. Professor Edward Leamer wrote in August 2008 that U.S. economic indicators
would “have to get much worse to pass the recession threshold.”
One may be able to rationalize the dramatic oil price spike of 2007-08 as a potentially
appropriate response to fundamentals. But what about the even more dramatic subsequent
price collapse? Certainly Trichet, Leamer, and everyone else changed their minds about
those assessments of real economic activity as the disastrous economic news of 2008:H2 came
in. But economic collapse alone is not a suﬃcient explanation for the magnitude of the oil
price decline, if the analysis in the top panel of Figure 10 is correct. Even a 10% drop of
global GDP would only undo the eﬀects of the rightward shift of the demand curve since
7 Introductory Statement from the ECB, http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2008/html/is080703.en.html.
152005. Bad as the news in 2008:H2 had been, it does not come close to that magnitude as
of yet, yet the price by the end of December was down to $40, well below the 2005 price of
$55. Nor can the modest production increases of another half-million barrels/day in 2008:H2
over 2008:H1 go too far as an explanation. Instead, one would need again to attribute a
signiﬁcant part of the 2008:H2 price collapse to yet another shift in the elasticity. Whereas
a short-run price elasticity of 0.06 might be needed to interpret developments of 2008:H1,
a higher intermediate-run elasticity, as petroleum users made delayed adjustments to the
earlier price increases, is needed to be postulated as another factor contributing to the price
decline in the second half of the year; (see the bottom panel of Figure 10).
It is hardly controversial to suggest that the long-run demand responses to price increases
are more signiﬁcant than the short-run responses. The more fuel-eﬃcient vehicles sold in the
spring and summer of 2008 are going to mean lower consumption, at least from those vehicles,
for many years to come. The EIA reported that U.S. petroleum and petroleum products
supplied in 2008:Q3 were 8.8% lower (logarithmically) than in 2007:Q3, a far bigger drop
in percentage terms than the presumed 6.3% rightward shift between the 2005 and 2008:H1
world demand curves assumed in the top panel of Figure 10, and again far in excess of
anything attributable to the drop in income alone.
3.3 The role of speculation.
One can thus tell a story of the oil price shock and subsequent collapse that is driven solely
by fundamentals. But the speed and magnitude of the price collapse leads one to give
serious consideration to the alternative hypothesis that this episode represents a speculative
16price bubble that subsequently popped. One proponent of the latter view has been Michael
Masters, manager of a private ﬁnancial fund who has been invited a number of times to
testify before the United States Senate. Masters blames the oil price spike of 2007-08 on
the actions of investors who bought oil not as a commodity to use but instead as a ﬁnancial
asset, claiming that by March 2008, commodity index trading funds held a quarter trillion
dollars worth of futures contracts. A typical strategy is to take a long position in a near-
term futures contract, sell it a few weeks before expiry, and use the proceeds to take the
long position in a subsequent near-term futures contract. When commodity prices are
rising, the sell price should be higher than the buy, and the investor can proﬁt, viewing this
as a synthetic way to take a long position in the commodity without ever physically taking
delivery. As more investment funds sought to take positions in commodity futures contracts
for this purpose, so that the number of buys of next contracts always exceeded the number
of sells of expiring, Masters argues that the eﬀect was to drive up the futures price, and with
it, the price of the associated spot commodity itself. He argues that this “ﬁnancialization”
of commodities introduced a speculative bubble in the price of oil.
The key intellectual challenge for such an explanation is to reconcile the proposed spec-
ulative price path with what is happening to the physical quantities of petroleum demanded
and supplied. To be concrete about the nature of this challenge, consider a representative
reﬁner who purchases a quantity Zt of crude oil at price Pt per barrel, of which Xt is used
up in current production of gasoline and the remainder goes to increase inventories It:
It+1 = It + Zt − Xt. (1)
17This is simply an accounting identity— if the quantity of oil that is consumed by users
of the product (in this case, Xt) is smaller than the quantity that is physically produced
(Zt), inventories must accumulate. If we hypothesize that, as a result of whatever process,
ﬁnancial speculation produces some particular value for the price Pt, that price necessarily
has implications for those who use the product (Xt) and those who produce it (Zt).I t s e e m s
impossible to discuss a theory of price Pt that makes no reference to the physical quantities
produced, consumed, or held in inventory.
To explore this issue more fully, consider the following simple model. Suppose that
the reﬁner produces a quantity of gasoline yt sold at price Gt (where both Pt and Gt are
measured in real terms), according to the production function
yt = F(Xt,I t).
The second term reﬂects the idea that it would be impossible for the reﬁner to operate
eﬃciently if it maintained zero stock of inventories. A positive value for the derivative
FI(Xt,I t) introduces a “convenience yield” from inventories, or motive for the ﬁrm to hold
a positive level of inventory even if it anticipates falling crude oil prices (Pt+1 <P t). The
reﬁner faces a real interest rate of rt and cost of physically holding inventories C(It+1). The
reﬁner’s objective is thus to choose {Zt,X t,I t+1}N






[GtF(Xt,I t) − C(It+1) − PtZt]
taking I0 and {Pt,G t}N
t=0 as given. Note I pose this as a perfect-foresight problem, since
the complications introduced by uncertainty are not relevant for the points I want to make
here, and liquid futures markets exist for Pt and Gt.







Equation (2) is the optimality condition associated with the ﬁrm purchasing one more barrel
of crude oil, whose marginal cost is Pt, and using the crude immediately to reﬁne and sell
more gasoline, whose marginal beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm is GtFX(Xt,I t). Equation (3) is the
condition required for optimal inventory management. If the ﬁrm buys one more barrel
of crude today to store as inventory, the marginal cost is Pt + C0(It+1). If the inventory
is then used to reduce next period’s crude purchases, the discounted marginal beneﬁti s
(1 + rt)−1 [Gt+1FI(Xt+1,I t+1)+Pt+1].
If the ﬁrm were to face an increase in Pt+1 with all other prices ﬁxed, it would respond
by increasing It+1 until (3) was restored. This plan would be implemented by increasing
current crude purchases Zt and decreasing Zt+1. In the market equilibrium that we will
ﬁnish spelling out shortly, that would put upward pressure on Pt and downward pressure on
Pt+1. But it’s interesting to comment now on the limiting case of a constant physical storage
cost (C0(It+1)=s) and constant convenience yield (FI(Xt+1,I t+1)=c), the latter including
as a special case zero convenience yield or a situation that inventories are already so high
that there would be no sales gains from building inventories even higher (FI(Xt+1,I t+1)=0 ) .
8 Speciﬁcally, the values of {Xt,Z t,I t+1}N
t=0 are determined as functions of {Qt,P t}N
t=0 from (2) for
t =0 ,...,N, (1)f o rt =0 ,...,N, (3) for t =0 ,...,N − 1, and the terminal condition IN+1 =0 .
19In this case (3) becomes
Pt + s =
1
(1 + rt)
[Gt+1c + Pt+1]. (4)
In this limiting case, (4) becomes an equilibrium condition that would have to characterize
the relation between Pt and Pt+1 in any equilibrium with nonzero inventories. If, for example,
the right-hand side of (4) exceeded the left, there would be an inﬁnite increase in the demand
for crude Zt and inﬁnite decrease in Zt+1, to which the equilibrium prices Pt and Pt+1 would
have to respond until the equality (4) was restored.
More generally, if C0(It) and FI(Xt,I t) are relatively ﬂat functions of It, then the eﬀect of
(3) is to force Pt and Pt+1 to move closely together. In crude oil markets, the futures price
Pt+1 serves an information discovery role, with any changes in the futures price translating
instantaneously into a corresponding movement in spot prices. For example, Figure 12
plots f1d, the price of crude oil for the nearest-term futures contract on day d,a n df3d,t h e
price of oil for the futures contract expiring two months after the expiration of the contract
associated with f1d. The two series move very closely together. For 93% of the 6,421
b u s i n e s sd a y sb e t w e e nA p r i l5 ,1983 and November 12, 2008, f1d and f3d c h a n g e di nt h e
same direction from the previous day. A regression of ∆lnf3d on ∆lnf1d has an R2 of 0.86.
Thus this part of Masters’ claim— that if speculation aﬀected the futures price, the spot price
would be forced to move with it— is very much consistent with both theory and evidence.
We can close the model by specifying that crude oil is exogenously supplied,
Zt = Zt, (5)
20and gasoline demand has a price elasticity of β:
lnF(Xt,I t)=α − β lnGt. (6)




Notice that if the marginal storage cost C0(It+1) is negligible, then equations (1)-(3)
and (5) are homogenous of degree 0 in {Pt,G t}N
t=0. Without (6)— if there were no response
of gasoline demand to the price of gasoline— the price of crude oil would be indeterminate.
Suppose we were initially in a situation where all 5 equations were satisﬁed, and consider the
limiting case when the demand for gasoline is perfectly price inelastic (β =0 ). Suppose that
for some reason speculators bid up the futures price of crude (Pt+1 increases). By inventory
arbitrage (3), Pt would have to go up with it. In this sense, we might claim to have a theory
of how ﬁnancial speculation in the oil futures price Pt+1 could be the determining factor in
the price of oil.
On the other hand, when the price elasticity β>0, the above analysis no longer goes
through. In response to the hypothesized increase in Pt+1 and Pt, the price of gasoline Gt
would go up from (2), the quantity of gasoline demanded would decline, and the crude Xt
needed to produce this would be lower. An increase in Pt+1 and Pt induced by speculation
would thus cause crude inventories It+1 to accumulate relative to the ﬁrm’s desired path.
If the price elasticity is small but not zero, this feedback would be subtle, and it is
conceivable that it would take some time before mispricing from the futures markets would
be recognized and corrected. It is interesting to note, however, that the same condition
21needed to rationalize a speculation-based interpretation of the oil shock of 2007-08— a very
low price elasticity of oil demand— is exactly the same condition that would enable us to
attribute the event to fundamentals alone.
The other possible way in which advocates of the price bubble interpretation might at-
tempt to reconcile their story with the physical side of the petroleum market is to hypothesize
a mechanism whereby the quantity of oil supplied Zt is itself inﬂuenced by the futures price.
Given the pressures for growth in petroleum demand from countries like China to continue,
if it remains diﬃcult to increase global production, the price pressures of 2008 are only the
beginning of the story. Recalling the Hotelling (1931) principle, it would in this situation
pay the owners of the resource to forego current production, in order to be able to sell the
oil at the higher future price. One might then argue that oil producing countries were
misled by the speculative purchases of oil futures contracts into reducing current production
Zt in response, by this mechanism reconciling the postulated speculation with the physical
dynamics of oil supply and demand (1); for more discussion see Jovanovic (2007).
If so, such miscalculation by oil producers could not have been based on comparing the
longer-term futures price with the spot price available in 2008. Figure 13p l o t st h et e r m
structure of prices implied by New York Mercantile Exchange futures contracts at the height
achieved by oil prices in July 2008. Although there was a modest upward slope in the
very near-term contracts (for example, the December 2008 contract sold for a higher price
than August 2008), that slope turned distinctly downward after the February 2009 contract,
meaning that any producers who used the futures contracts to sell their oil forward could plan
22on selling future production at a lower price than current production. This downward slope
from 2009 onward is inconsistent with a natural Hotelling interpretation of why producers
might keep oil in the ground. Notwithstanding, one might argue that producers distrusted
the futures markets, and could not use them as a signiﬁcant hedge given the volumes. Ex
post, the high spot price in 2008 meant that a country that had held oﬀ production from
2001 to 2008 would have been richly rewarded, which experience might persuade some of
the beneﬁts of not producing all out in 2008, either. Of interest is this report from Reuters
news service on April 13, 2008:
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah said he had ordered some new oil discoveries left
untapped to preserve oil wealth in the world’s top exporter for future generations,
the oﬃcial Saudi Press Agency (SPA) reported.
“I keep no secret from you that when there were some new ﬁnds, I told them,
‘no, leave it in the ground, with grace from God, our children need it’,” King
A b d u l l a hs a i di nr e m a r k sm a d el a t eo nS a t u r d a y ,S P As a i d .
With hindsight, it is hard to deny that the price rose too high in July 2008, and that
this miscalculation was inﬂuenced in part by the ﬂow of investment dollars into commodity
futures contracts. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the two key ingredients needed
to make such a story coherent— a low price elasticity of demand, and the failure of physical
production to increase— are the same key elements of a fundamentals-based explanation of
the same phenomenon. I therefore conclude that these two factors, rather than speculation
per se, should be construed as the primary cause of the oil shock of 2007-08. Certainly the
23casual conclusion one might have drawn from glancing at Figure 1 and hearing some of the
accounts of speculation9 — that it was all just a mistake, and the price should have stayed
at $50/barrel throughout the period 2005-08— would be profoundly in error.
4 Consequences of historical oil shocks.
In essentially any theoretical model of the economic eﬀects of a change in oil prices, a key
parameter is the value share such as the series plotted in Figure 3. To see why this is a
key parameter, consider for example a ﬁrm producing output Yt with inputs of capital Kt,
labor Nt,a n de n e r g yEt. Suppose that the ﬁrm is operating at a point where the marginal




Multiplying both sides of (7) by Et/F(Kt,N t,E t) establishes that the elasticity of output
with respect to energy is given by the value share,
∂ lnF(Kt,N t,E t)
∂ lnEt
= αt
for αt = PtEt/F(Kt,N t,E t). Alternatively, consider a consumer facing a π% increase in the
relative price of energy. One short-run option available to the consumer (and indeed, given
the empirical evidence reviewed above, not a bad approximation to what actually happens)
is to continue to purchase the same quantity of energy as before. This would require the
9 For example, the Obama campaign site in June of 2008 included a number of quotes from analysts such
as Shell President John Hofmeister that the proper range of crude oil is “somewhere between $35 and $65 a
barrel.” See http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2008/06/how_big_a_contr.html for details.
24consumer either to reduce saving or to cut spending on other items. If αt denotes the
consumer’s energy expenditure share, the requisite percentage cut in spending on other
items would be given by αtπ.
A large number of papers have investigated the economic consequences of previous oil
price shocks. Recent reﬁnements include investigations of the following: (1) nonlinearity
in the relation, with oil price increases having a bigger eﬀect on the economy than oil price
decreases (e.g., Hamilton, 2003); (2) the causes of the oil shock, with price increases brought
about by surging global demand having less of a disruptive eﬀect than those caused by losses
in supply (e.g., Kilian, forthcoming); and (3) a changing relation over time, with the modern
economy more resilient to an oil price shock than it had been historically (e.g., Blanchard
and Galí, 2008).
Although these issues are unquestionably quite important, it is useful to look ﬁrst at
some simple linear representations of the basic correlations in the historical data, with a
minor automatic adjustment for one source of a possible changing impact over time due
to the changes in αt. This is the approach taken by Edelstein and Kilian (2007). They
estimated monthly bivariate autoregressions of the form














where yt is a macro variable of interest and xt i st h ec h a n g ei nr e l a t i v ee n e r g yp r i c e sw e i g h t e d
25by the expenditure share,
xt = αt(lnPt − lnPt−1)
for αt the series plotted in Figure 3 and Pt the ratio of the personal consumption expenditure
deﬂator for energy goods and services to the overall PCE deﬂator. Thus for example a
unit shock to xt would result if there were a monthly 20% increase in relative energy prices
(lnPt−lnPt−1 =0 .20) at a time when energy consumed 5% of household budgets (αt =5 .0).
A unit shock to xt m e a n st h a th o u s e h o l d sw o u l ds u ﬀer a 1% loss in ability to purchase non-
energy items if they attempted to hold real energy consumption ﬁxed following a shock of
size xt = 1.
I re-estimated a number of the Edelstein-Kilian regressions for the sample period they
used (with the dependent variable running from 1970:M7 through 2006:M7), and ﬁrst report
the results for yt = 100(lnYt − lnYt−1) with Yt real personal consumption expenditures.
Figure 14 reproduces their orthogonalized impulse-response functions (with energy prices xt
ordered ﬁrst) for the cumulative consequences for the levels Xt =
Pt
j=1 xt and 100lnYt of a
unit shock to xt−s. The ﬁrst panel shows that there is relatively little serial correlation in
the energy price change series xt. Almost all of the price consequences appear within the
ﬁrst two months— if xt increases by one unit at time t, one would typically expect another
0.5 move up at t+1, with very minor subsequent adjustments resulting in an eventual 1.7%
cumulative loss in purchasing power as a result of a unit shock to xt.
The second panel shows the decline in real consumption expenditures following historical
energy price increases. There are two aspects of this graph that are not what one would have
26expected from the simple expenditure-impact eﬀect sketched above. The ﬁrst is the mag-
nitude of the response— following a decline that eventually would have reduced consumers’
ability to purchase non-energy items by 1.7%, we observe that on average consumers in fact
eventually cut their spending by 2.2%. Why should consumption spending fall by even
more than the predicted upper bound? The second surprising aspect concerns the timing—
although the price moves immediately reduce purchasing power, the biggest declines in total
spending don’t come until 6 months or more after the initial shock.
One way that Edelstein and Kilian sought to explain these anomalies is by breaking
down the responses in terms of the various components of consumption. Figure 15r e -
produces their ﬁndings for Yt corresponding respectively to the services, nondurables, and
durables components of real personal consumption expenditures. The magnitude of the
ﬁrst two responses is in line with the simple expenditure-share eﬀects, while the response of
expenditures on durable goods is ﬁv et i m e sa sb i g .
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 16 looks in particular at the motor vehicles component of
durables. In contrast to the gradual response one sees in broader consumption categories,
here the response is immediate and quite huge, with for example a 20% increase in energy
prices in an environment with an energy expenditure share of 5% resulting in a 10% decrease
in spending on motor vehicles. That there would be a direct link between such spending
and energy prices is quite plausible, and its mechanism comes not from the simple budget-
constraint eﬀect. Indeed, for this category of spending there are a number of other factors
that are much more important, such as postponing the purchase of a new vehicle until better
27information about where gas prices are going to end up is available and shifting the purchase
from bigger to more fuel eﬃcient (and perhaps less expensive) vehicles.
If we take it as given that there are big and immediate eﬀects on purchases of items such
as motor vehicles, both the delayed response and the multiplier eﬀect on other categories of
spending can also be better understood. The shift in spending means a reduction in income
for those employed in manufacturing and selling cars. Given the signiﬁcant technological
frictions in relocating the now underutilized labor and capital to other sectors, the result is
a decline in aggregate income and a loss in purchasing power over and above that caused by
the initial price increase itself (Hamilton, 1988).
The second panel of Figure 16p r e s e n t sas e c o n de ﬀect identiﬁed by Edelstein and Kilian
that is huge and immediate— a drop in consumer sentiment.10 F o rw h a t e v e rr e a s o n ,
consumers found the historical oil shocks to be very troubling events, with a 20% increase
in relative energy prices (assuming again a base case value share of αt =5 )producing a
15-point drop in the index of consumer sentiment. One can argue whether a response
of this magnitude is rational given the size of the shock. The budget consequences of
spiking gasoline prices are something consumers experience immediately, and represent an
aggregate event that forces everybody to make changes at the same time. Certainly if your
job is related to the auto industry (or if you perceive that what happens to them will have
eventual implications for your own job security), it’s quite rational to view these events as
10 Note that unlike the previous ﬁgures in which the second variable in the VAR, yt = 100(lnYt −lnYt−1)
represented a rate of change (with impulse-response graphs subsequently translated back into implications
for the levels 100lnYt), in the second panel of Figure 16, the variable yt is the level of the index of consumer
sentiment itself and the graph shows the consequences for yt+s following a unit shock to xt.
28carrying pessimistic implications beyond the immediate loss in spending power. In any
case, the changes in sentiment that we ﬁnd in the data could easily have made a signiﬁcant
contribution to the subsequent path of both consumption and investment spending.
Suppose we stick just to the narrowest eﬀect of the energy price shock, namely changes in
spending on motor vehicles and parts. How big a contribution would this alone have made
to the subsequent economic downturns, ignoring any possible multiplier eﬀects? The ﬁrst
column of Table 3 reports the actual average growth rate of real GDP over the 5 quarters
following each of the 4 historical oil shocks discussed here. All of these episodes— in which
GDP fell on average over a period of 5 quarters— are included in the list of U.S. economic
recessions. The second column does a very simple calculation, asking what the average
GDP growth would have been if there had been zero change in the motor vehicles and
parts component of GDP over these 5 quarters, with all other components of GDP staying
t h es a m ea sr e p o r t e d . 11 Although this is a modest contribution (less than 0.8% in any
episode), it is enough to move the average from negative to positive territory in the case of
the 1980 and 1990-91 recessions, oﬀering some basis for thinking that, had it not been for
the signiﬁcant downturn in autos in each of these episodes, they might have been regarded
as episodes of sluggish growth rather than clear recessions. By contrast, in the more serious
1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions, there was clearly something more signiﬁcant than just autos
bringing down the economy.
11 This was calculated by subtracting from the growth rate of real GDP the contribution of motor vehicles
and parts as reported in Table 1.5.2 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Note that this contribution is
a negative number in each episode, so that subtracting it would make the GDP growth rate bigger.
29I next examine the implications of two earlier studies of the eﬀects of oil prices on the
overall economy. The ﬁrst comes from Blanchard and Galí (2008), whose overall conclusion
was that oil shocks made a relatively modest contribution to the downturns of the 1970s
and are even less important today. Their analysis is based on a vector autoregression that
has 3 nominal shocks in addition to oil prices (as captured by the CPI, GDP deﬂator, and
wages), two output indicators (real GDP and total hours worked), and with the oil price
summarized by the average price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil over the quarter. All
variables were measured in quarterly percentage changes, and a quadratic time trend was
included. The authors estimated two separate versions of the VAR, the ﬁrst using data only
from 1960:Q1 to 1983:Q1,a n dt h es e c o n df r o m1984:Q1 to 2007:Q3.
Iu s e dt h eV A Rc o e ﬃcients as estimated from the separate subsamples to perform the
following calculation.12 One can form a dynamic forecast implied by the coeﬃcients for
what each of the 6 variables should have been for, say, 1974:Q1 through 1975:Q1 based
on information available (that is, the observed values of the 6 variables) as of 1973:Q4.
Associated with this forecast and the ex-post realized values of these variables is an implied
set of errors for forecasting each of the 6 variables for 1 to 5 quarters ahead, obtained by
comparing these forecasts with the actual values. One can decompose these observed errors
into contemporaneously orthogonal components, based on the variance-covariance matrix
used by Blanchard and Galí, and then ﬁnd the answer to the following question: what would
be the error predicting each of the variables up to 5 quarters ahead if we could condition on
12 I am most grateful to Davide Debortoli for supplying the data and code that were used for the original
estimation of the Blanchard-Galí paper.
30the ex post realizations of the innovations in oil prices, but did not know anything else?13
On the basis of this number, I calculated what the average GDP growth over 1974:Q1-75:Q1
would have been had there been no oil price shock but the other 5 shocks to the CPI, deﬂator,
wages, GDP, and hours had been identical to the realized historical residuals. The answer
to that “what if” question is reported in the third column of Table 3. The Blanchard-Galí
estimates imply that, had there been no oil shock, the severe downturn of 1973-75 would
have been only a very mild recession. Interestingly, although their estimated post-1984
eﬀects of oil prices are much smaller than those for their earlier sample, and although the
authors did not single out the aftermath of the First Gulf War as a separate oil shock, their
estimates also imply that, had the price of oil not spiked following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,
the U.S. might have avoided the 1990-91 recession.
Surprisingly, the Blanchard-Galí estimates imply that the 1981-82 downturn would actu-
ally have been more severe in the absence of disturbances to oil prices. This is because the
measure they used for the price of oil, the price of WTI, actually fell between July 1980 and
March 1981. Other indicators, however, suggest a very diﬀerent story. For example, the
13 Mathematically, the estimated VAR coeﬃcients imply a set of moving average matrices ˆ Ψs (as in
equation [10.1.19] in Hamilton, 1994), and the Cholesky factor of the residual variance matrix can be obtained
as ˆ Ω = ˆ Pˆ P
0
.T h e s-step-ahead forecast error can then be written
yt+s − ˆ yt+s|t−1 = ˆ ²t+s + ˆ Ψ1ˆ ²t+s−1 + ...+ ˆ Ψsˆ εt
for ˆ εt the implied one-step-ahead forecast errors. Deﬁne the orthogonalized residuals by ˆ vt = ˆ P−1ˆ εt and
let ˆ p1 denote the ﬁrst column of ˆ P. Then the contribution of {ˆ v1t,ˆ v1,t+1,...,ˆ v1,t+s} to this forecast error
is calculated as
Ps
k=0 ˆ Ψkˆ p1ˆ v1,t+s−k, and the calculation of what the value of yt+s w o u l dh a v eb e e ni nt h e
absence of the oil shocks is calculated as yt+s −
Ps
k=0 ˆ Ψkˆ p1ˆ v1,t+s−k. Note that although the VAR shocks
to oil prices and the CPI are correlated in the data (ˆ ε1t is correlated with ˆ ε2t), the shocks ˆ v1t and ˆ v2t are
orthogonal in the sample by construction. Thus when we ask what would have happened if ˆ v1t had been
zero but ˆ v2t had been as observed historically, we are implicitly subtracting out that movement in the CPI
that is correlated statistically with the oil price, and leaving in other, uncorrelated factors.
31E I A ’ ss e r i e sf o rt h er e ﬁner acquisition cost (the series plotted in the row 3, column 2 panel
of Figure 5) shows a 27% (logarithmic) increase over this same period, the BLS’s producer
price index for crude petroleum (the series used by Hamilton, 1983 and 2003) shows a 42%
increase, the BEA’s implicit price deﬂator for consumption expenditures on energy goods
and services (the series used by Edelstein and Kilian, 2007) shows a 12% increase, and the
BLS’s consumer price index for gasoline shows an 11% increase. It therefore seems likely
that, despite the results implied by Blanchard and Galí’s estimation, energy prices were a
factor reducing GDP growth over this episode along with the others.
As another comparison, I turned to the nonlinear speciﬁcation investigated in Hamilton
(2003), whose key result (equation 3.8) was a regression of quarterly real GDP growth on a
constant, 4 of its own lags, and 4 lags of the “net oil price increase”, deﬁned as the percentage
change in the crude oil PPI during the quarter if oil prices made a new 3-year high at the
time, and zero if oil prices ended the quarter lower than a point they had reached over the
previous 3 years. The coeﬃcients for that relation, estimated over t = 1949:Q2 through





























To get a sense of the magnitudes implied by these coeﬃcients,14 I calculated for each quarter
in the episode the diﬀerence between the 1-quarter-ahead forecast implied by equation (8),
14 One could in principle ﬁnd the answer to an s-period-ahead forecasting equation as in footnote 13,
though this would require a speciﬁcation of the dynamic path followed by the net oil price increase variable.
No such speciﬁcation was proposed in Hamilton (2003), and it seems unlikely that spelling one out would
change the results signiﬁcantly from the simpler calculation provided here.





had instead been equal to zero, and took this diﬀerence as a measure of the contribution
of the oil shock to that quarter’s real GDP growth. From the fourth column of Table 3,
it appears that this speciﬁcation would attribute almost all of the deviation from trend in
each of the four recessions to the oil shock alone.
To summarize, there is a range of estimates available as to the size of the contribution
that oil shocks have made to historical U.S. recessions. But even the most modest estimates
support the claim that the oil shocks made a signiﬁcant contribution in at least some of
these episodes. My conclusion is that, had the oil shocks not occurred, GDP would have
g r o w nr a t h e rt h a nf a l l e ni na tl e a s ts o m eo ft h e s ee p i s o d e s .
5 Consequences of the oil shock of 2007-08.
Let us begin by examining what happened to motor vehicle sales in response to the price
changes noted in Figure 6. Figure 17 reports sales in the U.S. of domestically manufactured
light vehicles broken down in terms of cars versus light trucks. The latter include the sport
utility vehicle (SUV) category, which up until 2007 had been outselling cars in the U.S.
market. Beginning in 2008, sales of SUVs began to plunge, and were down more than
25% relative to the preceding year in May, June and July. SUV sales rebounded somewhat
when gas prices began to fall in August, only to suﬀer a second hit in September through
December.
To what extent was the decline in SUV sales in the ﬁrst half of 2008 caused by rising
33gasoline prices as opposed to falling income? One measure relevant for addressing this
question is the contrast between the sales of light trucks (top panel of Figure 17) and those
of cars (bottom panel). A general drop in income would aﬀect both categories, whereas
the eﬀects of rising gasoline prices would hit light trucks much harder than cars. In the
event, domestic car sales were only down on average by 7% in May, June, and July 2008
compared with the same months in 2007. Even more dramatic are the comparisons for
imports. Imported cars were up 10% over these same three months (bottom panel of Figure
18). Sales of imported light trucks (top panel of Figure 18), by contrast, were down 22%.
Thus the dominant story in the ﬁrst half of 2008 was one in which American consumers were
switching from SUVs to smaller cars and more fuel-eﬃcient imports.
Although gasoline prices were likely a key factor behind plunging sales for U.S. automak-
ers in the ﬁrst half of 2008, falling income appears to be the biggest factor driving sales back
down in the fourth quarter of 2008. Here we see, in contrast to the ﬁrst half of 2008, the
sales decline was across the board, hitting cars if anything more than SUVs, and imports
along with domestics.
The result was a signiﬁcant shock to the U.S. auto industry in 2008:H1,q u i t ec o m p a r a b l e
in magnitude to what was observed in the wake of the oil shock of 1990. The contribution
of motor vehicles and parts to U.S. real GDP (measured in 2000 dollars at an annual rate)
was $30 billion smaller in 1991:Q1 t h a ni th a db e e ni n1990:Q3, similar to the $34 billion
decline in this sector between 2007:Q4 and 2008:Q2 (BEA Table 1.5.6). Granted, that $34
billion in 2007-08 represents a smaller share of total GDP than did the lost auto production
34in 1990-91, but the most recent slump still represents a sizable number, and it would be hard
to defend the claim that a recession began in 2007:Q4 had it not been for the contribution
from the auto sector. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 include details on this breakdown,
looking ahead either 4 or 5 quarters beginning with 2007:Q4. Focusing ﬁrst on just the four
quarters 2007:Q4-2008:Q3, average real GDP growth over this period was actually +0.75%
at an annual rate. Had there been no decline in autos, that number would have been nearly
half a percentage point higher. It would be very hard to characterize 2007:Q4-2007:Q3
as a full year of recession, had the average growth indeed been +1.2%. The Business
Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research reported that it was
looking not just at GDP (which even with the decline in autos showed clearly positive overall
growth), but also at gross domestic income, which diﬀers from GDP only by a statistical
discrepancy; (see Nalewaik, 2007). GDI growth averaged -0.4% over this period, oﬀering
more justiﬁcation for the NBER’s recession call. But again, without the hit to autos, this
number instead would also have registered positive, albeit very anemic, growth.
The 2007-08 shock was also comparable to 1990-91 in terms of the eﬀect on employment in
the automobile industry. Seasonally adjusted manufacturing employment in motor vehicles
and parts fell by 94 thousand workers between 1990:M7 and 1991M3, whereas it fell by 125
thousand between 2007:M7 and 2008:M8 (BLS series CES3133600101). Again the latter is
relative to a larger economy, but again it is not an inconsequential number. A year-over-year
drop in total employment is viewed by some as a deﬁning characteristic of a U.S. recession.
This threshold was crossed in June 2008, when 8,000 fewer workers were employed compared
35with June 2007. Again without the contribution of autos, it would not be at all clear that the
U.S. economy should have been characterized as being in recession during 2007:Q4-2008:Q2.
Of course, the ﬁrst half of 2008 saw not just a big decline in automobile purchases but also
a slowdown in overall consumer spending and a big drop in consumer sentiment, again very
much consistent with what was observed after other historical oil shocks. Like SUV sales,
consumer sentiment spiked back up dramatically in an initial response to falling gasoline
prices at the end of the summer, but, like SUV sales, then plunged back down as broader
economic malaise developed in the fall of 2008.
For some more formal statistical evidence and quantiﬁcation, I turn to several of the
studies described in the previous section. I ﬁrst examine in Table 4 how well the models
proposed in previous studies have performed in terms of describing data that have arrived in
the time since those papers were written. To evaluate the Edelstein-Kilian bivariate VARs,
I used the parameter values for the relations as estimated over 1970:M7-2006:M7 to form
forecasts over the post-sample interval 2006:M8-2008:M9. I compared those post-sample
one-month-ahead mean squared errors with the MSEs that would have been obtained by a
univariate autoregression (excluding energy prices) estimated over the same original sample
(1970:M7-2006:M7). As reported in the last column of Table 4, for each of the 6 Edelstein-
Kilian relations used here, energy prices made a useful contribution to the post-sample
forecasts, giving us some conﬁdence in using those estimates to measure the contribution
that energy prices may have made to what happened to the economy in response to the oil
shock of 2007-08.
36I used the Edelstein-Kilian relations as estimated over 1970:M7-2006:M7 to form a 1-t o
12-month-ahead forecast of how these variables might have behaved over 2007:M9 through
2008:M9 had there been no oil shock. The top panel of Figure 19p r e s e n t st h er e s u l t sf o rr e a l
personal consumption expenditures. The dotted line represents the forecast of the model
for PCE over these 12 months. In the absence of any new shocks, the Edelstein-Kilian
b i v a r i a t eV A Rw o u l dh a v ep r e d i c t e dc o n s u m p t i o nt oc o n t i n u eg r o w i n ga tt h er a t ei th a d
over the previous half year. In the event, actual consumption (the solid line) grew much
more slowly than predicted through May and then started to decline. The dashed line
represents the portion of the forecast error at any date that could be accounted for by the
cumulative surprises in energy prices between 2007:M9 and the indicated date, calculated
as described in footnote 13. Energy prices can account for about half of the gap between
predicted and actual consumption spending over this period. The second and third panels
repeat the exercise for the big drops in spending on motor vehicles and consumer sentiment.
Most of the declines in these two series through the beginning of 2008 and about half the
decline through the summer of 2008 would be attributed to energy prices according to the
Edelstein-Kilian regressions.
I also examined the post-sample performance of the Blanchard-Galí VAR as estimated
over their second subsample, 1984:Q1-2007:Q3. In this case I compared their 6-variable
VAR with a 5-variable VAR that leaves out oil prices. Their model with oil prices in fact
does somewhat worse at predicting GDP growth rates for data that appeared subsequent
to their study than would a similar VAR without oil prices; (see the third row from the
37bottom of Table 4). I nevertheless examined how much of the downturn of 2007-08 their
coeﬃcients would attribute to oil prices, looking at the errors made forecasting GDP growth
over 2007:Q4 to 2008:Q3 or Q4 on the basis of information available as of 2007:Q3, and at
the contribution of oil price surprises to these forecast errors. The result of this calculation
( r e p o r t e di nt h et h i r dc o l u m no fT a b l e3 )s u g g e s t st h a tr e a lG D Pg r o w t hw o u l dh a v eb e e n
0.7% higher on average in the absence of the oil shock. Thus, the Blanchard-Galí calcula-
tions also support the conclusion that the period 2007:Q4-2008:Q3 would not reasonably be
considered to have been the beginning of a recession had there been no contribution from
the oil shock.
Finally, I looked at the post-sample performance of the GDP-forecasting regression (8)
estimated by Hamilton (2003). As seen in the next-to-last row of Table 4, this relation has
about the same mean squared error over the period 2001:Q4-2008:Q4 as does a univariate
AR(4) ﬁtt ot h e1949:Q2-2001:Q3 data. In part this lack of improvement is due to the
fact that the oil-based relation predicts slower GDP growth than was observed for 2005 and
2006, when the price of oil rose but the U.S. economy seemed to be little aﬀected.
It is interesting to note that the historical relation (8) signiﬁcantly outperforms a uni-
variate speciﬁcation when evaluated on the same post-sample intervals used to evaluate the
Edelstein-Kilian and Blancard-Galí relations in Table 4. Equation (8) has a 45% improve-
ment in terms of the post-sample MSE over the period 2007:Q1-2008:Q4 compared with a
univariate autoregression. Indeed, the relation could account for the entire downturn of
2007-08; (see the last column of Table 3). If one could have known in advance what hap-
38pened to oil prices during 2007-08, and if one had used the historically estimated relation (8)
to form in a 1- to 5-quarter-ahead forecast of real GDP looking ahead to 2007:Q4 through
2008:Q4 from 2007:Q3, one would have been able to predict the level of real GDP for both
of 2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4 quite accurately; (see Figure 20).
That last claim seems hard to believe, since Blanchard and Galí are doubtless correct
that there has been some decrease in the eﬀects of oil prices as the economy has become
less manufacturing-based and more ﬂexible, and since the housing downturn surely made
a critical contribution to the recession of 2007-08. Nevertheless, a few points about the
respective contributions of housing and the oil shock deserve mentioning. I would note ﬁrst
that housing had been exerting a signiﬁcant drag on the economy before the oil shock, de-
spite which economic growth continued. Residential ﬁxed investment subtracted an average
of 0.94% from the average annual GDP growth rate over 2006:Q4-07:Q3, when the economy
was not in a recession, but subtracted only 0.89% over 2007:Q4-2008:Q3, when the recession
began. At a minimum it is clear that something other than housing deteriorated to turn
slow growth into a recession. That something, in my mind, includes the collapse in auto-
mobile purchases, slowdown in overall consumption spending, and deteriorating consumer
sentiment, in which the oil shock was indisputably a contributing factor.
Second, there is an interaction eﬀect between the oil shock and the problems in housing.
Cortright (2008) noted that in the Los Angeles, Tampa, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Portland-
Vancouver Metropolitan Statistical Areas, house prices in 2007 were likely to rise slightly
in the zip codes closest to the central urban areas but fall signiﬁcantly in zip codes with
39longer average commuting distances. Foreclosure rates also rose with distance from the
center. And certainly to the extent that the oil shock made a direct contribution to lower
income and higher unemployment, that would also depress housing demand. For example,
the estimates in Hamilton (2008) imply that a 1% reduction in real GDP growth translates
into a 2.6% reduction in the demand for new houses.
Eventually, the declines in income and house prices set mortgage delinquency rates be-
yond a threshold at which the overall solvency of the ﬁnancial system itself came to be
questioned, and the modest recession of 2007:Q4-2008:Q3 turned into a ferocious downturn
in 2008:Q4. Whether we would have avoided those events if the economy had not gone
into recession, or instead would have merely postponed them, is a matter of conjecture.
Regardless of how we answer that question, the evidence to me is persuasive that, if there
had there been no oil shock, we would have described the U.S. economy in 2007:Q4-2008:Q3
as growing slowly, but not in a recession.
Lastly I take up the question of why the oil price increases prior to 2007:Q4 failed to
have a bigger eﬀect on the economy. Why did consumers respond so little when the price of
oil went from $41/barrel in July 2004 to $65 in August 2005 (a 59% increase), and yet were
observed to have such a big response to the increase from $72 in August 2007 to $134 (an
86% increase) in June 2008?15 Equations posed in terms of percentage changes, such as
(8), would predict that the 2004-2005 price increases should also have had signiﬁcant eﬀects
on output. However, in terms of the dollar impact on household budgets, the $62/barrel
15 Oil prices quoted here are monthly averages of daily West Texas Intermediate prices.
40price increase in 2007-08 is considerably more than twice as signiﬁcant as the $24/barrel
increase in 2004-2005.
To explore this possibility more concretely, I looked at the consequences of modifying
equation (8) to take into account the changes in the energy budget share over time, replacing
o
#
t with the product o
#
t αt−1 for αt the energy share plotted in Figure 3.16 This results in a
slight improvement in ﬁt for the original sample period (t = 1949:Q2 to 2001:Q3), raising the
log likelihood from -281.78 for the original speciﬁcation to -281.47 for the new. The share-
weighted regression has a signiﬁcantly better post-sample performance, producing a 10.8%
improvement in the MSE over the period 2001:Q4-2008:Q4 relative to an autoregression with
no role for oil prices. For the speciﬁc years 2005:Q1-2006:Q4, the modiﬁed speciﬁcation as
estimated over 1949:Q2 to 2001:Q3 would have predicted an average annual real GDP growth
rate of 1.9%, a bit below the sluggish 2.5% that was actually observed.
Oil prices thus appear to have exerted a moderate drag on real GDP in 2005-2006 and
made a more signiﬁcant negative contribution in 2007-2008. The principle reason that
Americans ignored the earlier price increases would seem to be because they could aﬀord to
do so. By 2007:Q4, they no longer could, and the sharp spike in oil prices led to an observed
economic response similar to what we had seen in earlier episodes.
16 The monthly series was converted to quarterly by using the third month of the quarter. Values for αt
for t prior to 1959:Q1 were simply set equal to the January 1959 value (7.354).
416 Policy implications.
I have raised the possibility that miscalculation of the long-run price elasticity of oil demand
by market participants was one factor behind the oil shock of 2007-08, and that speculative
investing in oil futures contracts may have contributed to that miscalculation. Were any
policies available to mitigate this? One option to consider would have been for the U.S.
government to sell some oil directly out of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the spring of
2008, perhaps timing the sales to coincide with the NYMEX crude contract expiry dates.
If there was speculative momentum buying, such steps might have succeeded in reversing
it. If not, the worst would be that the government made a proﬁt on its SPR investment by
buying low and selling high.
A more conventional policy tool would be monetary policy. A number of observers
suggested that the very rapid declines of short-term interest rates in 2008:Q1 fanned the
ﬂames of commodity speculation, with negative real interest rates encouraging investments
in physical commodities (e.g., Frankel, 2008). In January 2009, Federal Reserve Chair Ben
Bernanke oﬀered the following retrospective on that debate:
The [Federal Open Market] Committee’s aggressive monetary easing was not
without risks. During the early phase of rate reductions, some observers ex-
pressed concern that these policy actions would stoke inﬂation. These concerns
intensiﬁed as inﬂation reached high levels in mid-2008, mostly reﬂe c t i n gas u r g e
in the prices of oil and other commodities. The Committee takes its responsi-
bility to ensure price stability extremely seriously, and throughout this period
42it remained closely attuned to developments in inﬂation and inﬂation expecta-
tions. However, the Committee also maintained the view that the rapid rise in
commodity prices in 2008 primarily reﬂected sharply increased demand for raw
materials in emerging market economies, in combination with constraints on the
supply of these materials, rather than general inﬂationary pressures. Committee
members expected that, at some point, global economic growth would moderate,
resulting in slower increases in the demand for commodities and a leveling out in
their prices—as reﬂected, for example, in the pattern of futures market prices. As
you know, commodity prices peaked during the summer and, rather than level-
ing out, have actually fallen dramatically with the weakening in global economic
activity. As a consequence, overall inﬂation has already declined signiﬁcantly
and appears likely to moderate further.
Bernanke seemed here to be taking the position that since the Fed got the long run cor-
rect (ultimately there would be a signiﬁcant downturn in both the economy and commodity
prices, with strong disinﬂationary pressure), the short-run consequences (booming commod-
ity prices in 2008:H1) were less relevant. On the other hand, if it is indeed the case that
the spike in oil prices was one causal factor contributing to the downturn itself, the Fed can
hardly aﬀord to ignore those short-run implications. The evidence examined here suggests
that the Fed needs to give careful consideration to the possible consequences of its actions
for relative commodity prices.
But while the question of the possible contribution of speculators and the Fed is a very
43interesting one, it should not distract us from the broader fact: some degree of signiﬁcant
oil price appreciation during 2007-08 was an inevitable consequence of booming demand and
stagnant production. It is worth emphasizing that this is fundamentally a long-run problem,
which has been resolved rather spectacularly for the time being by a collapse in the world
economy. However, the economic collapse will hopefully prove to be a short-run cure for the
problem of excess energy demand. If growth in the newly industrialized countries resumes at
its former pace, it would not be too many more years before we ﬁnd ourself back in the kind
of calculus that was the driving factor behind the problem in the ﬁrst place. Policy-makers
would be wise to focus on real options for addressing those long-run challenges, rather than
blame what happened last year entirely on a market aberration.
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Table 1. Estimates of absolute value of short-run demand price elasticity. 
 
Study Product Method  Elasticity
Dahl and Sterner 
(1991) 
gasoline literature  survey  0.26 
 Espey (1998)   gasoline  literature survey  0.26 
Graham and Glaister 
(2004) 
gasoline literature  survey  0.25 
Brons, et. al. (2008)  gasoline  literature survey  0.34 
Dahl (1993)  oil (developing 
countries) 
literature survey  0.07 






Source: Hamilton (2009). 
 
Table 2. Sizes of quantity and prices changes in historical oil shocks. 
Episode  Supply reduction  Price change  Implied elasticity 
Oct 73 - Mar 74  4.0%  41.3%  0.10 
Nov 78 - Jul 79  1.3%  38.7%  0.03 
Oct 80 - Mar 81  1.2%  25.8%  0.05 
Aug 90 - Oct 90  2.9%  71.6%  0.04 
Notes. Second column.  Average shortfall of global production of crude petroleum over 
indicated period as a percent of global production the month before the indicated episode.  
Third column. Cumulative change in 100 times the natural log of crude oil price over the 
indicated episode.  Data sources same as those for Figure 5.  Fourth column.  Ratio of 
second to third columns.  
 
 
Table 3. Average annual real GDP growth rates under alternative scenarios. 







1974:Q1-75:Q1  -2.5% -2.0% -0.1% +2.3% 
1979:Q2-80:Q2  -0.4%  +0.4% +0.4% +2.5% 
1981:Q2-82:Q2  -1.5% -1.3% -2.0% +2.0% 
1990:Q3-91:Q3  -0.1%  +0.2% +0.5% +3.6% 
2007:Q4-08:Q3  +0.7%   +1.2%   +1.4%  +4.2% 
2007:Q4-08:Q4  -0.7% -0.0% -0.2% +3.2% 
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Notes. Monthly average price of West Texas Intermediate divided by ratio of consumer 
price index for indicated month to consumer price index for November 2008, for 
1947:M1 through 2008:M12. 51 
 





















Notes. Horizontal axis: cumulative change in natural logarithm of U.S. real GDP between 
1949 and the year for which a given data point is plotted, from Bureau of Economic 
Analysis Table 1.1.6.  Vertical axis: cumulative change in natural logarithm of total 
petroleum products supplied to U.S. market between 1949 and the year for which a given 
data point is plotted, from Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum Overview, 
1949-2007”, Table 5.1 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb0501.html).  Source: 
Hamilton (2009). 52 
Figure 3. Dollar value of energy expenditures as a percentage of total consumer 
expenditures, 1959:M1-2008:M9. 








Notes. Calculated as 100 times nominal monthly consumption expenditures on energy 
goods and services divided by total personal consumption expenditures.  Data source: 
BEA Table 2.3.5U, “Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product and 
Expenditure,” obtained from Econstats (http://www.econstats.com/nipa/ 
NIPA2u_2_3_6U_.htm). 53 
Figure 4. Monthly oil production for Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. 
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Notes. Monthly crude oil production, including lease condensate, in barrels per day, 
1973:M1-2007:M6.  Data source: Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy 
Review, September 2007, Table 11.1a (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/ 
mer_data.asp?table=T11.01a). 54 
Figure 5. Changes in production, oil price, and inventories after 4 historical disruptions. 
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Inventory change after Sept 1980
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Notes. First column.  Bold line shows change in monthly production of crude oil for: (a) 
OAPEC since Sept 1973 as a percentage of total world production in Sept 1973, plotted 
as a function of number of months since Sept 1973; (b) Iran since Oct 1978 as a 
percentage of total world production in Oct 1978; (c) Iran plus Iraq since Sept 1980 as a 
percentage of total world production in Sept 1980; (d) Iraq plus Kuwait since July 1990 
as a percentage of total world production in July 1980.  Dashed line shows corresponding 
percentage decline in total global production of crude oil relative to the indicated starting 
month. Data source: Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, July 
2008, Table 11.1a (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01a). 
Second column. 1973: change relative to indicated starting month in 100 times the natural 
log of seasonally unadjusted BLS producer price index for crude petroleum. 1978, 1980, 
and 1990: cumulative change in 100 times the natural log of monthly refiner acquisition 
cost for crude petroleum, from Energy Information Administration, 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_rac2_dcu_nus_m.htm.  Third column. change in 
end-of-month U.S. stocks of crude oil and petroleum products within the indicated month 
as a percentage of total world production.  Data source: Energy Information 
Administration, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_wstk_dcu_nus_m.htm. 55 
















Notes. Cumulative change since August 2007 in 100 times the natural log of the indicated 
series.  PPI = producer price index for crude petroleum.  WTI = monthly average price of 
West Texas Intermediate.  RAC = refiner’s acquisition cost for crude petroleum.  CPI = 
consumer price index for gasoline.  PCE = implicit price deflator for personal 
consumption expenditures on energy goods and services. 56 
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Notes. Thin line. Monthly global crude oil production, including lease condensate, natural 
gas plant liquids, other liquids, and refinery processing gain, in millions of barrels per 
day, 2003:M1-2008:M10.  Data source: Energy Information Administration, “Total Oil 
Supply,” January 2009, Table 1.4 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t14.xls).  Bold  line: 
12-month moving average of values from thin line centered at indicated date, with end-
of-sample values representing average of  6 { ,..., } tt s x x −+  for feasible s. 57 
Figure 8. Crude oil production from selected countries or fields in thousands of barrels 
per day. 
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Notes. Adapted from Figures 11, 13, and 14 in Hamilton (2009). First panel. Moving 
average of preceding 12 months of monthly production figures for the United States, 
December 1920 to February 2008, from EIA, “Crude Oil Production.”  Second panel. 
Sum of U.K. and Norway crude oil production, monthly moving average of  preceding 12 
months, December 1973 to June 2007, from EIA, Table 11.1b.  Third panel. Annual 
production from Cantarell complex in Mexico.  Data for 1996 to 2006 from Pemex 2007 
Statistical Yearbook.  Data for 2007 from Green Car Congress 
(http://www.greencarcongress.com/2008/01/mexicos-cantare.html).  Fourth panel. Saudi 
monthly production January 1973 to January 2008, from EIA, Table 11.1a. 58 
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Notes. Data source: EIA, “World Petroleum Consumption, Most Recent Annual 
Estimates,1980-2007,” (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/ 
RecentPetroleumConsumptionBarrelsperDay.xls), December 2008. 59 
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Notes. Bold line: average U.S. stocks of crude petroleum (excluding Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve) at indicated week of year over 1990 to 2007.  Data source: EIA, 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/xls/pet_stoc_wstk_dcu_nus_w.xls.  Thin dashed line: 
values for 2007.  Short-dashed line: values for 2008.61 
 
Figure 12. Daily price of futures contracts for nearest month (1-month forward) and 3-















Data source: Energy Information Administration, “NYMEX Futures Prices,” 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_fut_s1_d.htm. 62 
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Notes. Closing price on July 11, 2008 of  NYMEX light sweet crude contract for 
settlement in indicated month.  Data source: Norma’s Historical Data 
(http://normashistoricaldata.com/).63 
Figure 14. Response of real personal consumption expenditures to an increase in energy 
prices that would have reduced disposable income by 1%. 
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Response of total consumption







Notes. Impulse-response functions and 95% confidence intervals as estimated from data 
1970:M7 to 2006:M7. First panel: response of  0
t
j tj X x = = ∑ to a one-unit shock to  ts x −  
plotted as a function of s. Second panel: response to 100 times the log of real personal 
consumption expenditures at time t to a one-unit shock to  ts x −  plotted as a function of s.  
Second panel reproduces (with re-normalization) Figure 8a in Edelstein and Kilian 
(2007). 64 
Figure 15. Responses of  real consumer spending on services, nondurables, and durables. 
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Notes. Impulse-response functions (and 95% confidence intervals) for bivariate VARs 
based on energy prices and indicated component of consumption spending.  Reproduces 
with renormalization Figure 8b-d in Edelstein and Kilian (2007). 65 
Figure 16. Responses of real consumption spending on motor vehicles and parts and 
consumer sentiment. 
Motor vehicles


















Notes. Impulse-response functions (and 95% confidence intervals) for bivariate VAR 
based on energy prices and (a) real personal consumption expenditures on motor vehicles 
and parts or (b) University of Michigan index of consumer sentiment.  See also footnote 
10.  Reproduces with renormalization Figures 8e and 11a in Edelstein and Kilian (2007). 66 
Figure 17. U.S. sales of domestic cars and light trucks. 




































U.S. sales of cars and light trucks manufactured in North America, in number of units 
sold per month.  Source: http://wardsauto.com/keydata/. 67 
Figure 18. U.S. sales of cars and light trucks manufactured outside of North America. 


































U.S. sales of cars and light trucks manufactured outside of North America, in number of 
units sold per month.  Source: http://wardsauto.com/keydata/. 68 
Figure 19. Contribution of energy prices and other factors to total real consumption 































Notes. In each panel, solid line is the actual value of the series over 2006:M9 through 
2008:M9, dotted line is the forecast for 2007:M9 through 2008:M9 formed on the basis 
of information available as of 2007:M8, and dashed line is the forecast for 2007:M9 
through 2008:M9 conditional on information available as of 2007:M8 plus innovations in 
the energy price measure over 2007:M9 through 2008:M9.  Top panel: real personal 
consumption expenditures.  Middle panel: real personal consumption expenditures on 
motor vehicles and parts.  Bottom panel: Michigan/Reuters index of consumer sentiment. 69 
Figure 20.  Dynamic forecasts of GDP formed as of 2007:Q3 with and without 




























Notes. Solid line: 100 times the natural log of real GDP. Dotted line: dynamic forecast 
(1- to 5-quarters ahead) based on coefficients of univariate AR(4) estimated 1949:Q2 to 
2001:Q3 and applied to GDP data through 2007:Q3.  Dashed line: dynamic conditional 
forecast (1- to 5-quarters ahead) based on coefficients reported in equation (8) (which 
was estimated over 1949:Q2 to 2001:Q3) applied to GDP data through 2007:Q3 and 
conditioning on the ex-post realizations of the net oil price increase measure 
#
ts o +  for t + s 
= 2007:Q4 through 2008:Q3. 